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In his essay, "Language as Gesture" Richard Blackmur attempts to develop 
the idea of "gesture" in poetry; along the way, he takes a short detour through 
other arts: architecture, dance, sculpture, painting, acting, and music. This detour 
is not just a pleasant excursion, however; it is fundamental. As he puts it, 
if gesture is of such structural importance in poetry as I claim 
for it, then the other arts should attest for it an equivalent 
importance; it is in such matters that there should be a substantial 
unity in all art. . 
As he goes through each of the art forms, using "example and not 
argument"2 to define gesture, he offers a most striking example from the art of 
acting. He describes an experience of watching a play at the Boston Opera House. 
The play was Tolstoy's The Living Corpse (which Blackmur had not read), and it 
was produced in German (a language that Blackmur did not understand), and despite 
these difficulties, or perhaps because of them, Blackmur found a clear example of 
gesture in the performance of Alessandro Moissi (an actor that Blackmur hadn't 
heard of). For Blackmur, the words of the play were only tangentially important 
to the actor's art. They were, as he put it, "transparencies used to time and to 
bound the acting. What the mere words were [. . .] must have been rubbish."3 
In this single example Blackmur speaks volumes about the limits and the 
possibilities of his project to shed light on the nature of "gesture." It would seem 
that gesture is not bound by language—nor is it bound by culture. In fact, the 
words (text) may serve a regulating function ("to time and bound") in art, but texts 
are, in a sense, the empty vessels that are filled by gesture. 
All of the examples that Blackmur offers solidify the notion that gesture 
is not bound by language, and Moissi's "good" acting certainly illustrates this as 
well. But his performance stands out from the other examples, because it is the 
only one of the "other arts" that Blackmur cites which utilizes language. In non-
linguistic art forms (architecture, music, dance, painting, and sculpture) it is perhaps 
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easier to ignore the linguistic and cultural barriers that restrain gesture, but the 
example of acting foregrounds the truly messy questions that Blackmur manages 
to avoid in the essay: what effect does culture have on gesture? Can gestures be 
translated from one cultural code to another? 
In Blackmur's understanding of acting, the answer to the latter question 
would appear to be yes. He saw a play written in one country (Russia) and 
performed in a different country (The United States) by actors in the language of a 
third country (Germany), and the gesture of a specific actor came through to him 
clearly. The question that he avoids dealing with head on is how this transmission 
occurred. He says only that the "conventions of voice and movement," employed 
by Moissi, "must have been universal to western man since I understood them so 
well."4 
But let us dig a little deeper into this process. Assuming for a moment 
that a concept called "gesture" exists and that it contains aspects of communication 
(transmission of gesture) which are universal (or at any rate understood widely) 
across cultures (at least western culture), it should be possible to understand this 
universalizing principle and its most essential elements. I do this, not to be picky, 
or to pick apart Blackmur's essay in order to dismiss it, but rather to expand it, 
remembering, with Blackmur, that "we wish to get back to poetry with our sense 
of gesture fortified rather than obstructed."5 
Blackmur's sketchy comments about the reception of meaning by a 
spectator in the theatre are a convenient point to begin expanding the notion of 
gesture. In the essay, the dynamic of gesture that exists between the actor and the 
spectator is characterized by the relationship between one spectator, Blackmur 
himself, and one actor, Moissi. Though he is "speaking for himself (in the first 
person), Blackmur seems to have some insight into Moissi's intentions, or at any 
rate, his inner motivations. "How," he muses, " . . . can the actor understand the 
play of words unless they seem to rise and set with him as his own meaning?" And 
he adds, "great acting bodies forth the gestures only of great words: no more."6 
By identifying his own receptive filters—his inability to understand German and 
his lack of previous knowledge of both the play and the actor—he gives presence 
to the spectator as a creator (or at least receiver) of gesture, but, one might ask, 
"how did this meaning reach Blackmur, seated in the Boston Opera House that 
night?" Blackmur thought it significant to point out the great gulf that these 
meanings had to traverse—from the mind of a Russian to a German, across a 
proscenium arch, through (or in spite of) three languages, and into the mind of an 
American critic. Blackmur allows the majesty of this gulf to yawn impressively, 
validating the universal nature of gesture. 
This is where he stopped, and this is where I feel compelled to begin. At 
my peril, I choose to enter that metaphorical gulf and try to see how "gesture" 
bridges it. I will borrow Blackmur's method of analysis by extending his search 
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for the character of gesture into recent work on intercultural theatre by Eugenio 
Barba and Peter Brook. They have both taken up the challenge to answer how art 
can be understood across cultural boundaries. Both have toured extensively in 
Europe, America, Africa, and Asia looking for the essential quality of theatre 
(seemingly similar to Blackmur's idea of gesture) that is present for all people, not 
just "western man." Just as they have travelled around the world looking for 
gesture in theatre, I hope that my journey through their work will illuminate the 
concept of gesture. 
In The Paper Canoe: A Guide to Theatre Anthropology Eugenio Barba 
chronicles a lifetime spent searching for a "pre-expressive moment" of sats (I will 
contend that this is very much the same project as Blackmur's search for gesture) 
in which the actor has found the most basic level of artistic communication. Like 
Blackmur, Barba is searching for the quality of art that transcends genre, text, and 
culture. 
Barba identifies a "performance culture"—a culture that is formed among 
artists, and which does not observe national boundaries. He says, "the theatrical 
profession is also a country to which we belong, a chosen homeland, without 
geographical borders."7 Within this performance culture, despite all of the 
difficulties imposed by language differences, it is possible to discover what Barba 
calls "sats" which he says occurs, 
in the instant that precedes the action, when all the necessary 
force is ready to be released into space but as though suspended 
and still under control, the performer perceives his/her energy 
in the form of sats, of dynamic preparation." (Barba's emphasis)8 
This pre-expressive moment of potential energy is remarkably similar to the 
description of gesture that Blackmur offers for architecture: "the sense of movement 
in 'actually' inert mass and empty space is what we call gesture in architecture," 
and sculpture: "The movement arrested, in the moving stillness, there is a gesture 
completed at the moment of its greatest significance."9 Also, just as bad gestures 
can be made in all of the arts according to Blackmur, sats that are poorly executed 
can become "inorganic, that is, they suppress the performer's life and dull the 
spectator's senses." Barba also accepts that sats is not limited to theatre; it is also 
present in [at least] opera, sports, and film.10 
Barba then sets out to find out how sats can be identified and taught. He 
is interested in the very project that I am undertaking, a study in detail of the 
transmission of meaning from actor to spectator across cultures. Along the way, 
he encounters a variety of problems similar to those that remain unspoken in 
Blackmur's work: those of controlling audience response and cultural contexts. 
As mentioned earlier, Blackmur makes the question of audience response 
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transparent and seemingly unimportant by making himself the example of every 
spectator or in some cases referring to an ambiguous "we" or "us." As a theatre 
practitioner, however, Barba has no choice but to face the audience [both 
figuratively and literally]. He acknowledges this quite freely, saying that, "the 
theatre's raw material is not the actor, nor the space, nor the text, but the attention, 
the hearing, the seeing, the mind of the spectator. Theatre is the art of the 
spectator."11 
Given this emphasis on the spectator, Barba designs and focuses his 
training techniques on giving the actor the skills necessary to transmit meaning to 
observers. He cites an example of a time when this proposed communication 
broke down: 
We were simply showing what the technical work of an Odin 
[Barba's theatre company] performer consisted of, what training 
was. We made a mistake. The observers immediately turned 
into spectators. They believed the actress was showing a scene 
from a performance rather than exercises.12 
This points to a fissure in Barba's system, into which Blackmur also risks 
falling: the completely individual and unpredictable response of the reader/spectator 
which often occurs even though a skilled actor is supposed to lead a spectator's 
imagination in a "precise, chosen, objective direction."13 In fact, it seems that all 
of Barba's effort is spent in an attempt to control the apparently overwhelming 
force of random and diverse audience response. He responds to this "problem" 
by offering: 
It is materially impossible to prevent the spectator from 
attributing meanings and from imagining stories when seeing a 
performer's actions even when it is not intended that these actions 
represent anything. (Barba's emphasis)14 
Is this the phenomenon that Barba would call "inorganic" sats or that 
Blackmur would call "bad gesture"—when the meanings transmitted are not bound 
by the gesture that the performer intended? Is this pofysemia, this multiplicity of 
unintended meanings the end of the possibility of a gesture which can be 
transmitted? Barba attempts a rescue by saying, 
But let us be careful. It is not the action itself which has its own 
meaning. Meaning is always the fruit of a convention, of a 
relationship [. . .] The point is whether or not one wishes to 
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programme which specific meanings must germinate in the 
spectator's mind. (Barba's emphasis)15 
Perhaps a "convention" or "relationship" properly manipulated with good sats can 
save us from disappearing into the metaphorical chasm that separated Blackmur 
from Moissi. Just as Blackmur reached the limit of his analysis by accepting the 
concept of a "universal" to explain the transmission of gesture, Barba leaves us 
with the unexamined notion of "convention" which gives rise to a number of other 
terms which must be explained before one is satisfied that gesture has been 
transmitted effectively. Here enter "culture" and "context." Barba was able to 
minimize their impact on the transmission of meaning as long as he could maintain 
the artificial distinction of a "performance culture" which contained a shared cultural 
context, but when faced with the spectator, the uninitiated, the other, he is forced 
to return to "conventions" to explain the strategy for dealing with a multiplicity of 
unintended meanings. 
The British director Peter Brook has faced this quandary, and although 
he is also searching for a universal nature of theatre, his method involves 
experimenting with the clash of different cultures rather than acknowledging a 
"performance culture." In 1968 Brook went to Africa with a multicultural troupe 
of actors, including performers from all over the European continent and one actor 
from Japan. His troupe toured from village to village, trying to find a gesture in 
theatre that was so basic that it could be understood "universally." This journey 
was successful in the sense that it resulted in a piece of theatre called The Conference 
of the Birds, but along the way, Brook and his actors faced a variety of perplexing 
cultural exchanges. The experience of a performance in Nigeria, as described by 
John Heilpem, illustrates the problems of relying on "conventions" and "culture" 
to contain meanings, and to make them predictable. 
After a crowd had gathered, Brook had his actors begin by singing, hoping 
to strike a universal chord with the Nigerian spectators, but there was, it seems, a 
"problem" with reception: 
[. . .] almost without exception, everything in the show, every 
single event and happening, every improvisation, every sure-
fire routine, every joke, every trick, everything, everything 
failed.16 
The term failure seems to mean that the show did not have the "intended" 
positive effect. The crowd appeared to have no reaction. The gestures that the 
performers made were seemingly lost on the way to the spectators. But were they 
lost? The example of Katsulas, one of the actors, calls this thesis into question: 
"Trying all he knew to hold the show together, the only reaction he managed to get 
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from the crowd was the one that finished him. Without meaning to, this huge and 
gentle man terrified the children."17 The children ran from him. There was 
something that was transmitted. It was not the intended meaning, but clearly 
something crossed the chasm and affected the spectator. 
The prospect of misunderstanding, and even meaninglessness now 
presents itself as a limit in Brook's project. A failure to communicate, and a failure 
(an impossibility?) of communicating an intention threatens the search for 
universals. After the performance in Nigeria, Brook makes a tactical and theoretical 
retreat in an attempt to explain the lack of reaction by the Nigerians. Instead of 
turning to "universals of western man" (which he cannot very well do in Africa) 
he seeks refuge, like Barba, in "conventions": 
Attempting to create a universal language, the show had been 
built entirely around a theatre convention of the West [...] The 
audience couldn't understand what was happening because it 
couldn't share the convention [. . .] Offer an audience a theatre 
convention that it doesn't understand and the lie will be given to 
the convention. It will become what it is, no more than a device: 
a cliche.18 
Brook's reaction to this alleged failure was to try harder to strip the Western 
prejudice inherent in his work, while still hoping to find a universal theatre (a 
project similar to Barba's). But if a convention, theatrical or otherwise, is no more 
than a device, a lie, a cliche, then how can it serve as a refuge for the possibility of 
a universal utterance? If a convention is an artificial creation which has no 
"substance" of its own then how can the actor rely on it for the transmission of the 
true meanings of the work? Additionally, what can be said about the only instance 
in the Brook example when a gesture appeared to reach its audience—the example 
of the frightened children? Was it a mistake? A misunderstanding? Meaningless? 
As I have endeavored to show, Brook, Barba, and Blackmur all rely on a 
universalizing principle of some sort, a standard by which the transmission of 
"correct" meanings could be judged. Though all of them accept that there is a 
possibility of polysemia in these meanings, they seem to conclude the 
communication is only a success if the actor succeeded in having his/her gesture 
understood on some level. When understanding does not result, then the gesture 
was a failure (bad gesture, inorganic sats9 the wrong convention). Ironically, the 
search for a universalizing principle seems to be the very thing that is hindering 
them (and me) from answering the question of how the communication of gesture 
happens, and the question still remains: Without relying on "western man," sats, 
or "convention," how did the gesture from Alessandro Moissi reach Richard 
Blackmur? 
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An answer, or rather a deeper question, may lie in that mysterious example 
of the frightened children. This was dismissed by the Brook troupe as a failure, a 
failure of Katsulas to communicate his gesture, his presence, to the children. But 
one cannot dismiss this failure. Perhaps the answer, if there is one, resides in 
Jacques Derrida's way of describing this seemingly inexplicable transmission of 
what is, for Brook, non-meaning. In "Signature Event Context" Derrida 
deconstructs the notion of communication in general as a universalizing principle 
which privileges the transmission of meaning: "As writing, communication, if one 
insists upon maintaining that word, is not the means of transport of sense, the 
exchange of intentions and meanings, the discourse and communication of 
consciousness."19 Starting from this assumption that communication does not 
necessarily result in the transmission of what could be called meaning, he goes on 
to problematize the notion of polysemia as a complete compliment to the "intended" 
meaning. He offers the term dissemination as more useful than polysemia: 
The semantic horizon that habitually governs the notion of 
communication is exceeded or punctuated by the intervention 
of writing, that is of a dissemination that cannot be reduced to 
polysemia. Writing is read and "in the last analysis" does not 
give rise to a hermeneutic deciphering, to the decoding of a 
meaning or truth. (Derrida's emphasis)20 
The concept of dissemination, which includes intended meanings and unintended 
meanings, as well as "failed" communications, which are thought to be meaningless, 
acknowledges the silent reaction of the Nigerian spectators. It includes the reactions 
of the frightened children, of the spectators watching Barba's exercises, and of 
Blackmur watching Moissi. For Derrida, there is no universal principle, no basic 
level at which understanding is common among people. The performance of an 
actor will never contain or convey the fully present gesture of the actor. The 
performance, taken merely as a sign in a chain of signification, will disseminate 
both "meanings" and "failures" (non-meanings) none of which can be said to be 
any closer to an "intended" or "originary" meaning.21 
But is this distinction stifling? Does replacing meaning with dissemination 
end the project of attempting to find out what Blackmur is identifying as gesture? 
On the contrary, it opens up a space of possibility at the same point when Brook, 
Barba, and Blackmur were forced to stop. It allows the critic to examine "gesture" 
in way that avoids universalizing (as much as this is possible to do) by accepting 
that, "the system of speech, consciousness, meaning, presence, truth, etc., would 
only be an effect, to be analyzed as such."22 This is not to say that abstract 
"universals" should be rejected, only that they lose their claim to "presence" and 
are acknowledged to be constructions. Katsulas need not be "finished" by 
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frightening the children because he need not seek to create a fully present gesture 
in the mind of the children. He is free to experiment without the pressure of 
finding the "right" reaction. 
What form might an examination of gesture take without the absolute 
measure of a universalizing principle? First, the metaphorical gulf that seemed so 
vast before, is now, obviously, a construction based on a notion that "there is a gap 
there"—That is, something that "presence" must find a bridge to cross in order to 
get from the actor to the spectator. Once we accept the thesis that "full presence" 
is not identifiable or perceivable, the gulf becomes a chain in which those meanings 
that we attribute to the larger concept "gesture" are seen to be effects that arise out 
a specific set of unquantifiable circumstances, links on a chain that cannot be 
followed back to their origins. This does not mean that what has been called 
"gesture" does not exist. It simply means that it is not a "truth" that can be verified 
by comparison to universal ideal. Gesture (with a capital "G") may not exist, but 
gestures, to the extent that they are contingent upon the alleged moment of their 
construction and on the multiplicity of signs and their dissemination, can be said 
to exist as effects of a system of language. 
Dissemination may be seen as the philosophical approximation of the 
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. There may not be any way to find the position 
of an electron in an ever-changing atom, but this does not mean that the atom does 
not exist. It is simply contingent on an unquantifiable distinction. Heisenberg did 
not stop the discipline of quantum physics by imposing a principle which removed 
the possibility of "Truth" in the form of a Grand Unified Theory. In fact, those 
who followed him had a much more careful methodology for dealing with the 
individual event. The same holds true for Derrida and the idea of dissemination. 
Gesture must now be looked at carefully as an effect, contingent upon a uncentered 
system of signs. How might we talk about this citational and contingent form of 
gesture? 
I return to a phrase of Barba's for a possible model (in the sense of a 
constructed paradigm) of gesture. Barba spoke disparagingly of spectators 
"imagining stories" (see above) while watching a performer. I will try to recuperate 
this term by suggesting that this "storying," as I will call it, is a way to discuss 
gesture. It contains the notion of contingency—an imagined story is not a "natural" 
assumption; it is clearly constructed (i.e. written). Also, "story" is not dependent 
upon full presence in its utterance (it contains the possibility—or perhaps the 
necessity—of fiction). A gesture is, in fact, based upon the interplay of fictive 
frames of reception. When these fictive frames are seen to be true, natural, or 
universal, the gesture loses its fictive power: that is, the gesture is stifled because 
it is seen only in terms of an unverifiable "presence" in opposition to "absence." 
Also, "storying" in this sense cannot seem to have a beginning (ontology) or ending 
(telos), except where these terms are acknowledged to be artificial distinctions. 
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Nor is there any sense in which "storying" is intelligible or, at any rate, reducible 
to a set of meanings. It must remain an open text. 
To return to the example of Blackmur and Moissi, it is clear that Moissi 
constructed some sort of story from, among other innumerable factors (none of 
which were more "present" than any others), the text of the play. Blackmur, sitting 
in the audience, also constructed a story from this performance (among other 
innumerable factors), and he called part of that story "gesture." In another part of 
the story, he cited that experience, grafting it into another part of this story, one 
part of which was the essay "Language as Gesture." The interplay of these different 
stories—the shifts between fictive frames—could be called gesture. 
"Storying" is, like any other model, incomplete, and the term should not 
become fixed or even particularly "meaningful." The above example is too simple 
and obvious to describe the complex relation of signs which could be called gesture, 
but it is a start, a call to open the book on "gestures" and to keep it open, resisting 
the necessity of relying on universal principles to create a chasm which those 
same principles would also prevent us from crossing. 
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